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Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment
(FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). By combining data on US outbound FPI and FDI, this paper
analyzes whether the composition of US outbound capital flows reflect efforts to bypass home country
tax regimes and weak host country investor protections. The cross-country analysis indicates that a
10% decrease in a foreign country's corporate tax rate increases US investors' equity FPI holdings
by 21%, controlling for effects on FDI. This suggests that the residual tax on foreign multinational
firm earnings biases capital flows to low corporate tax countries toward FPI. A one standard deviation
increase in a foreign country's investor protections is shown to be associated with a 24% increase in
US investors' equity FPI holdings. These results are robust to various controls, are not evident for debt
capital flows, and are confirmed using an instrumental variables analysis. The use of FPI to bypass
home country taxation of multinational firms is also apparent using only portfolio investment responses
to within-country corporate tax rate changes in a panel from 1994 to 2005.  Investors appear to alter
their portfolio choices to circumvent home and host country institutional regimes.
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1. Introduction 
  Alternative financial instruments that provide the same economic exposure can have 
differing tax treatments and control implications.  For example, combinations of derivatives 
instruments can replicate payoffs to other instruments yet receive differing tax treatment and 
control rights.  For outbound international investments from the U.S., foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) both provide access to country-specific 
diversification opportunities. However, they differ markedly in the degree to which investors are 
exposed to local investor protections and the degree to which those investments are subject to the 
U.S. corporate tax regime.  Specifically, FDI outbound flows are typically associated with whole 
ownership of foreign corporations and are subject to the American worldwide corporate tax 
regime, while FPI flows are non-controlling stakes in foreign corporations that are only subject 
to the local corporate tax regime.
1  
  Consider the example of American investors hoping to access newly available global 
diversification opportunities in China.  Concerns about the rights available to minority investors 
might tilt investors towards accessing those opportunities via investments in US multinational 
firms that undertake FDI in China, to ensure that investor interests are better protected. On the 
other hand, investing through U.S. multinational firms to access Chinese diversification 
opportunities creates an additional corporate tax obligation, as the U.S. taxes the returns these 
firms earn in China upon repatriation.    
This paper investigates whether the composition of outbound capital flows from the U.S. 
reflects these desires to circumvent the residual tax imposed by the U.S. and weak investor 
protections in host countries.
2 This paper employs data on patterns of outbound U.S. FPI from 
the Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting system and on outbound U.S FDI from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Figure 1 depicts the ratio of US equity FPI to US FDI for 
                                                 
1 Equity FPI involves the purchase of a minority stake (according to US tax rules, less than 10% of voting shares) in 
a foreign corporation by (typically) a US-resident individual. In contrast, FDI involves the purchase of a controlling 
stake (according to US tax rules, more than 10% of voting shares) in a foreign corporation by (typically) a US-
resident corporation. 
2 Rather than investigating the extent of “home bias” in portfolio holdings, this paper investigates the use of equity 
FPI relative to US FDI, given some (possibly suboptimal) desire on the part of investors for global diversification.   2
a sample of countries with significant stock market activity.
3 As Figure 1 demonstrates, the ratio 
of outbound FPI to FDI varies significantly across countries that are of comparable levels of 
economic development, giving rise to the possibility that taxation and investor protections might 
affect the desirability of these alternative diversification vehicles. 
The potential effects of taxation on FPI result from the interaction between home and 
host country taxes.  In particular, the U.S. taxes multinational firms legally domiciled in the U.S. 
on their worldwide income. As a consequence of this policy regime, U.S. investors should prefer 
FPI as a means of accessing foreign diversification opportunities, particularly in low-tax 
countries where the residual tax imposed by the U.S. will be most burdensome. In effect, FPI 
allows investors to avoid any residual tax arising from the worldwide regime on investment 
income earned abroad. Conversely, the absence of the residual US tax should make US equity 
FPI sensitive to variations in foreign corporate tax rates, even controlling for any effects of 
corporate taxes on levels of US FDI.  As such, the worldwide system of taxing income may 
vitiate the diversification benefits of multinational firms, emphasized in papers such as Errunza, 
Hogan and Hung (1999) and Cai and Warnock (2006).    
A weaker institutional environment in the host country should make both FPI and FDI 
less attractive to US investors.  More specifically, however, the extent of legal protections for 
minority shareholders against expropriation by controlling shareholders should differentially 
affect the attractiveness of FPI and FDI. In particular, weaker investor protections should make 
FDI, with its controlling feature, a more desirable means of accessing foreign diversification 
opportunities. This paper provides a simple framework that demonstrates these effects of 
corporate taxes and investor protections and the assumptions required for them to be operative.   
This paper uses both cross-sectional and panel data to test these hypotheses. Overall, the 
analysis shows a large and robust negative effect of foreign countries’ corporate tax rates on the 
amount of US equity FPI (relative to US FDI) that they attract. In the cross-sectional analysis, 
the estimated elasticity of equity FPI flows with respect to tax rates is -2.1, which is substantially 
larger than standard measures of the elasticity of FDI to tax rates. An index of investor 
protections for minority shareholders (based on disclosure requirements, liability standards, and 
                                                 
3 The sample, as described in Section 3, is based on the countries with the largest aggregate stock market 
capitalization in 1993 (La Porta et al., 2006), excluding those without significant amounts of either US equity FPI 
and US FDI.   3
anti-director rights) also influences the relative desirability of equity FPI.  Specifically, a one 
standard deviation increase in the investor protection measure – approximately equivalent to the 
difference between Italy and Norway - increases FPI flows by 24%. These analyses are robust to 
a variety of controls. Reassuringly, these effects are not apparent for flows of debt FPI (for which 
both corporate tax rates and investor protections should be less relevant). An instrumental 
variables analysis (using legal origins, latitude and ethnolinguistic fractionalization as 
instruments for corporate tax rates and investor protection) reinforces these results.  
A longitudinal analysis of changes in corporate tax rates over the period 1994-2005 
provides an alternative test of the effects of taxes on FPI.  Using only within-country variation in 
corporate tax rates, and controlling for other relevant factors and for country-specific time trends, 
reductions in corporate tax rates are associated with increases in equity FPI, relative to FDI. 
Patterns of FPI by U.S. investors thus appear to be significantly influenced by both corporate tax 
rates and investor protections. 
This paper only investigates the portfolio choices of U.S. investors. While this is a 
limitation of the results, there are a number of offsetting advantages associated with this 
approach. First, data collected by the U.S. on both FPI and FDI outflows is of very high quality 
and, given the magnitude of U.S. outbound flows, cover a wide variety of countries with varying 
tax rates and investor protections. Second, the tax regime employed by the U.S. on outbound FDI 
creates a set of interactions with local corporate tax rates that can influence the choice between 
FPI and FDI.  Finally, focusing exclusively on the behavior of U.S. investors also implicitly 
controls for a variety of host-country institutional and tax characteristics that may otherwise 
confound the analysis. It should also be noted that while the analysis in this paper is restricted to 
the choices of US investors, it is also applicable to other countries that tax the worldwide income 
of their corporations. 
This paper extends the large literature on FDI and taxation to FPI and contributes to the 
emerging literature on how investor protections can shape cross-border capital flows.
4  As noted 
by Graetz and Grinberg (2003), FPI holdings have grown in recent decades and have become 
                                                 
4 Desai and Hines (2004) review the literature that examines how corporate taxes distort various aspects of FDI, 
including the location of real activity, its financing, its organizational form, and the allocation of profits across 
countries.   4
comparable in magnitude to FDI holdings,
5 yet analyses of their determinants and the role of 
taxation have been limited. The only previous paper to analyze the links between corporate 
taxation and FPI is Gordon and Jun (1993).
6 Gordon and Jun (1993) use data on inbound 
investment into the US from 10 foreign countries during the 1980’s. They find some evidence 
that tax factors explain differences across countries in the composition of their capital flows to 
the US, but hypothesize that the small sample size and the presence of capital controls limit the 
observed responsiveness of FPI to taxes. The analysis in this paper extends Gordon and Jun 
(1993) by focusing on outbound FPI from the US, taking advantage of the rapid growth of FPI in 
more recent years, and incorporating a richer set of country controls, including investor 
protections.
7    
This paper is also related to the literature on how investor protections influence cross-
border capital flows. This literature has recently expanded to consider the effects of investor 
protections in open economies. Specifically, Gertler and Rogoff (1990) and Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon (2002) develop models in which weak investor protections can influence capital 
flows. Antras, Desai and Foley (2007) show that multinational activity and FDI flows can arise 
endogenously in a world of varying investor protections.  Albuquerque (2003), Alfaro et al. 
(2007) and Dharmapala and Hines (2006) examine how FDI flows respond to institutional 
variations.  Kho, Stulz and Warnock (2006) argue that weak investor protections in many 
countries limit the number of shares that are available to outside shareholders (including foreign 
portfolio investors) and hence helps shape the location of US FPI.  Two recent papers - Giannetti 
and Koskinen (2007) and Ju and Wei (2007) - develop models that jointly consider FDI and FPI 
and their relative merits in settings characterized by weak financial markets.  This paper further 
                                                 
5 For instance, in the dataset used in this paper, the equity FPI holdings of US investors (averaged across the 
countries in the sample) exceeds the stock of FDI by US corporations (averaged across the same set of countries) – 
see Table 1. 
6 The neglect of taxation and FPI is somewhat ironic given that the original theoretical analyses of the determinants 
of global diversification (e.g. Black, 1974; Stulz, 1981) emphasized taxes, literally and figuratively, as barriers to 
international investment.  While taxes were subsequently neglected in this literature, more recent work in this area 
has explored the role of informational and governance effects on international portfolio decisions using the TIC data. 
For example, Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004) highlight the role of information costs in determining which 
foreign firms US investors hold equity in; in particular, they argue that informational costs can be reduced by 
foreign firms cross-listing in the US. Ammer et al. (2006) show that US investors tend to hold more equity in 
foreign firms with higher quality accounting standards. 
7 The other literature on taxes and FPI emphasizes short-run trading strategies, such as dividend stripping (e.g. 
Christofferson, et al., 2005). More generally, studies of the role of taxes on portfolio choices, as reviewed in Poterba 
(2002), typically neglect the international dimension of taxes and portfolio decisions. Huizinga and Nicodeme 
(2004) examine the impact of taxes on international deposits, but do not analyze equity flows.   5
develops this line of inquiry by exploring these predictions with a data source that distinguishes 
between types of FPI, measures FDI and equity FPI comparably across a wide variety of 
countries, and jointly considers the role of taxes and investor protections. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 elaborates on the effects of taxes and investor 
protections on FPI.  Section 3 describes the data and the empirical methodology.  Section 4 
presents the results of the cross-sectional analysis and Section 5 presents the panel analysis.  
Section 6 concludes.            
2.   Corporate Taxes, Investor Protection, and FPI: A Simple Framework 
The main hypotheses tested in this paper can be derived from an extremely simple 
framework. Within this setup, US-resident investors are assumed to choose some optimal mix of 
FPI and FDI as vehicles for foreign investment, based on the tax and institutional characteristics 
of the country to which exposure is sought.
8 Consider a U.S.-resident individual who desires 
exposure to the asset returns available in country F to achieve greater diversification. The 
investor can buy shares in a US-based multinational firm that owns a controlling stake in a 
corporation located in country F. Alternatively, she may buy shares in a corporation based in 
country F – i.e. engage in equity FPI – either individually or through an institutional investor 
such as a mutual fund.  The basic question addressed in this paper is how the interaction of home 
and host tax regimes and the investor protections of the host country influence this choice. 
First, consider the impact of taxes on this decision. Let r
F be the pretax rate of return 
available in country F, and define the following tax rates: 
t
F
C: F’s corporate tax rate 
t
F
W: F’s withholding tax rate on dividends 
t
US
C: US corporate tax rate 
t
US
P: US personal tax rate on dividends 
When the investor invests in a US multinational firm that engages in FDI in country F, the 
subsidiary in country F earns a pretax return r
F that is subject to F’s corporate tax. Then, the 
after-tax profits are repatriated to the US multinational, which is subject to US corporate tax on 
the repatriated income (but with a foreign tax credit allowed for taxes paid abroad). Finally, the 
                                                 
8 There is no presumption that the extent of investors’ preference for international diversification is necessarily 
optimal – i.e. investors may suffer from “home bias” for a variety of reasons.   6
US multinational pays out the remaining income as dividends to the investor, who is subject to 
US personal tax on this dividend income.  
On the other hand, if the investor engages in equity FPI, she buys shares in a corporation 
domiciled in country F. This corporation earns a pretax return r
F that is subject to F’s corporate 
tax. The remaining income is paid out by the foreign corporation to its shareholders, including 
the investor in the US. These dividends would typically be subject to a withholding tax by 
country F. In addition, the US personal tax applies to the investor’s dividend income (but with a 
foreign tax credit allowed for withholding taxes paid to F). 
  The range of possible scenarios can be simplified by making the following assumptions, 
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i.e. the foreign corporate tax rate is no higher than that of the US, and the foreign withholding tax 
rate is no higher than the US personal tax rate on dividends. Then, an investor who chooses the 
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Here, variations in the foreign corporate tax rate t
F
C influence the after-tax return from FPI, but 
not that from FDI.   
A comparison of Equations (3) and (4) demonstrates that the U.S. system of taxing 
multinational firms creates an incentive for investors to use FPI to access foreign diversification 
opportunities in low-tax countries.  An implication of this comparison is that levels of U.S. FPI 
should be sensitive to the local corporate tax rate, after controlling for any effects of taxes on 
                                                 
9 The current top US statutory corporate tax rate is 35%, while the mean corporate tax rate for the sample of foreign 
countries in the dataset is 30%.  More generally, as noted in Engen and Hassett (2003), the U.S. now has a higher tax 
rate than most of the major economies that are significant destinations for FPI and FDI.  Since the 2003 tax reform, 
the top US personal tax rate on dividend income has been 15%. Most withholding tax rates imposed by foreign 
countries on dividends paid to US shareholders are no higher, and often lower, than 15% - see Anderson (2006, 
Chart 9.1).   7
U.S. FDI. It is important to note that this hypothesis does not relate to how local corporate taxes 
affect corporate activity generally, but rather specifically to an effect on US investors’ choice of 
FPI versus FDI.  In the empirical specifications outlined below, various measures of economic 
activity, including most importantly levels of FDI, are used as control variables, in order to 
isolate this specific “bypass” effect. 
There are three important caveats to this characterization. First, the residual US corporate 
tax is levied only at the time of repatriation, creating a potential deferral advantage if the 
subsidiary in country F delays repatriation. As such, the after-tax return under the FDI scenario 
will generally depend on t
F
C as well as on t
US
C. Indeed, the empirical literature shows that US 
FDI is quite responsive to variations in foreign countries’ tax rates (e.g. Desai and Hines, 2004). 
However, as long as the residual US tax imposes some additional burden, there would still 
remain an incentive for investors to bypass this residual tax. Thus, specifications that test if 
equity FPI is sensitive to t
F
C, controlling for FDI, remain valid tests of the hypothesis that 
investors use FPI to circumvent the residual tax owed to the US. 
Second, r
F may not be the same for both types of investment. Firms engaging in FDI may 
receive economic rents so that the return to US FDI in country F may exceed the rate of return 
available to domestic firms in that country.  The sources of these rents are typically thought to be 
firm-specific (i.e. intangible assets or managerial abilities) rather than country-specific.  
Nonetheless, it is possible that countries differ systematically in the degree to which these rents 
can be realized and this variation may happen to be related to variations in corporate tax rates. 
Thus, the empirical analysis seeks to control for a variety of country characteristics that are likely 
to be related to these synergies, and the panel analysis controls for this and other sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries.   
Finally, this logic assumes that corporate tax rates are not fully capitalized into pretax 
rates of return.  Specifically, if the pretax return r
F fully adjusts to reflect t
F
C (as in the model of 
Gordon (1986)), then these effects would not be operative. For instance, suppose that there is a 
worldwide (after-corporate-tax) rate of return r*. Then, if t
F




C) – variations in t
F
C across countries will be irrelevant to the equilibrium location of US 
FPI.  There are many reasons to expect imperfect capitalization of t
F
C into pretax returns.  For 
instance, if each country’s equities have different risk characteristics, then stocks in one country   8
will not be perfect substitutes for those in another country, giving rise to some degree of 
imperfect capital mobility.  Such circumstances would constitute a sufficient condition for 
observing the results in this paper.
10  
The effects of investor protections on the location of FPI are more straightforward than 
the tax effects. Suppose that controlling shareholders in the foreign country are able to 
expropriate a fraction b of the returns from a foreign corporation. Then, the after-tax return from 
FDI remains identical to that shown in Equation (3), assuming that the US-based multinational’s 
insiders do not expropriate shareholders, or equivalently normalizing b = 0 for the US. The after-






P)                (5) 
Thus, the use of FDI effectively bypasses weak investor protections abroad. In other words, the 
value of the control that is conferred by FDI is more valuable in contexts with weak investor 
protection. Accordingly, the second basic hypothesis that is tested in the empirical analysis 
below is that the amount of US equity FPI, relative to US FDI, should be higher in countries with 
stronger investor protections. This is tested in a cross-sectional setting given the limited time 
series variation in investor protections during the sample period. 
As minority shareholders can anticipate partial expropriation by insiders, it might be 
expected that weak investor protections will be fully capitalized into share prices, so that the 
pretax returns abroad rise to r
F/(1 – b). In such circumstances, variation in the strength of 
investor protections across countries will not affect the location of US equity FPI.  However, just 
as in the tax case, there are reasons to expect that full capitalization may not occur.  Kho, Stulz 
and Warnock (2006) argue that weak investor protections lead to high optimal levels of insider 
ownership, limiting the number of shares that can be issued to outsiders (including foreign 
portfolio investors). Giannetti and Koskinen (2007) develop a model in which the equilibrium 
share price reflects both demand by insiders and outsiders. As the insiders’ demand takes 
account of the private benefits that are available for capture, the equilibrium share price is not 
                                                 
10 It is not possible to infer from these results that there is imperfect capitalization of t
F
C in equilibrium. Consider the 
panel results in Table 4 below, which suggest that increases in t
F
C lead to outflows of US equity FPI.  This result is 
consistent with a world with imperfect capitalization, but the results may also be interpreted as capturing the 
disequilibrium capital flows that help move r
F towards an equilibrium value of r*/(1 - t
F
C). As such, it is not possible 
to draw any definitive inferences from these results about the incidence of the corporate income tax.   9
fully discounted for the possibility of expropriation. Under such conditions, countries with 
stronger investor protections would also be expected to attract larger amounts of US equity FPI. 
3.   Data and Empirical Specification 
3.1.   Data 
The dataset used in this paper merges data on US investors’ portfolio holdings of foreign 
securities with data on the FDI positions of US firms, foreign countries’ corporate tax rates, the 
investor protection index constructed by La Porta et al. (2006), and a variety of control variables. 
The observations are at the country level (for the cross-sectional analysis) and the country-year 
level (for the longitudinal analysis). The main features of the data are described below, and more 
detailed explanations of the variables are provided in the Data Appendix. 
  The data on FPI by US investors are obtained from the US Treasury’s Treasury 
International Capital (TIC) reporting system.
11 The TIC system reports the portfolio holdings of 
foreign securities by US investors, based on responses to periodic surveys from a defined panel 
of banks, other financial institutions, securities brokers and dealers. The location of the holdings 
is defined for each of approximately 120 countries and territories, and is available for 1994, 
1997, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005. The data, which represent stocks of assets at year end, are 
divided into three categories – equity FPI (i.e. holdings of foreign stocks), long-term debt FPI, 
and short-term debt FPI.
12 
  The TIC data are highly comprehensive, given the wide range of financial institutions and 
securities brokers and dealers that are surveyed, and likely to be accurately reported.
13 There are, 
however, several limitations of the data. First, while the data achieve comprehensive coverage of 
US investors’ holdings through institutions and other reporting entities, they may not be as 
comprehensive for small individual investors’ non-institutional holdings of foreign assets 
(Bertaut, Griever and Tryon, 2006, p. A67). Such holdings, however, are likely to be relatively 
                                                 
11 These data are available at www.treas.gov/tic/ and are described in more detail in the Data Appendix; see also 
Bertaut, Griever and Tryon (2006). 
12 Short-term debt FPI is not available prior to 2001. The firm-level data from TIC have previously been used to 
investigate the determinants of US investors equity holdings in foreign firms (e.g. Ahearne, Griever and Warnock, 
2004; Ammer et al., 2006), but not to analyze the questions studied in this paper. 
13 Bertaut, Griever and Tryon (2006, p. A63) argue that: “The country attribution of the portfolio asset surveys 
should be extremely accurate. The annual position surveys, by design, attempt to collect information by country of 
issuer . . . precisely identifying each security issuer’s country of residence – from information supplied by survey 
reporters as well as from commercial data sources – is a relatively straightforward task.”   10
small in magnitude. Second, the data do not include stock swaps and cross-border derivatives 
positions (although data collection on the latter began in 2005). Importantly, however, US 
holdings of foreign assets through American Depositary Receipts (ADR’s) are included.
14 
Finally, the country of location is defined as the legal residence of the entity issuing the 
securities, and may not correspond to the country where the associated “real” economic activity 
is carried out. Thus, US investors’ portfolio holdings in small offshore financial centers and tax 
havens are potentially difficult to interpret. However, most such countries are excluded from the 
dataset due to missing data on the investor protection index or other variables. The sample does 
include five countries that are often classified as tax havens (e.g. Dharmapala and Hines, 2006, 
Table 1, Column 3); however, the basic results – both in the cross-section and the panel – are 
robust to omitting these countries. 
  The data on FDI are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The data 
represent the direct investment positions of US-based multinational firms in each of a large 
number of foreign countries. Including FDI in the analysis reflects the conceptual framework 
presented in Section 2, where FPI and FDI are envisaged as alternative channels for achieving 
foreign exposure.  
  The tax variable used in the analysis is the top statutory corporate income tax rate. This is 
obtained from the two sources – the World Tax Database maintained by the Office of Tax Policy 
Research at the University of Michigan,
15 and the data provided by the accounting firm 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ worldwide summaries of corporate tax rates. The former is used in the 
cross-sectional analysis, but is not available for years after 2002. Thus, the longitudinal analysis 
uses only the PriceWaterhouseCoopers data. Clearly, the effective rates faced by firms may 
differ from the statutory rates. As long as variations across countries in statutory rates (or, in the 
panel analysis, variations over time in a given country’s statutory tax rate) are associated with 
variations in effective rates, then the former should be a reasonable proxy for the latter.  
 La  Porta  et al. (2006) construct an index of investor protections based on the securities 
laws of various countries and on a questionnaire of law firms located in each country. This 
measure has three elements.
16 The first is an index of the disclosure requirements imposed on 
                                                 
14 See www.treas.gov/tic/ 
15 This is available at: http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/ 
16 For more details, see La Porta et al. (2006, Table I).   11
issuers of equities by the country’s corporate and securities law. These requirements relate to 
disclosures about controlling shareholders, insider ownership, and related-party transactions. The 
second is an index of the procedural difficulty associated with a shareholder bringing a civil suit 
and recovering damages from the corporation, its directors and officers, or its auditors for 
misleading statements in the prospectus or its accompanying financial statements. The third is an 
index of shareholder rights vis-à-vis the firm’s directors, including the procedural ease with 
which shareholders’ meetings can be called and directors replaced. These measures reflect the 
extent to which the legal system mandates disclosure and facilitates private enforcement by 
shareholders against the issuers of equities. 
  The investor protection index is only available for the cross-sectional analysis and is the 
principal component of the disclosure, liability and anti-director rights measures described 
above. The index takes on values from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger shareholder 
rights. Note that this measure captures a very specific element of a country’s institutional 
environment – the legal protections afforded to minority shareholders against expropriation by 
controlling shareholders and other insiders. Thus, an advantage of the investor protection 
measure is that it captures precisely the feature of the institutional environment that is most 
relevant to the choice between FPI and FDI. More general features of countries’ institutions are 
controlled for in the empirical analysis using other variables described below.  Summary 
statistics for the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1.    
  The index is available for the 49 countries with the largest stock market capitalization in 
1993. Five countries are excluded in the analysis – the U.S., Nigeria (due to missing TIC data), 
and three countries where either equity FPI or FDI holdings are below US$5 million in 2005: 
Jordan, Kenya and Uruguay.
17  This leaves the set of 44 countries that are listed in the Data 
Appendix and for which the ratio of FPI to FDI is shown in Figure 1.  While this sample is small, 
it includes most countries with significant stock market activity, and hence those locations that 
are most relevant for the portfolio investment choices of US investors. Additionally, the sample 
excludes most small tax havens and offshore financial centers, for which the interpretation of FPI 
is potentially problematic.  For the countries being analyzed, the equity FPI holdings of US 
                                                 
17 The longitudinal analysis is also restricted to this same set of 44 countries, in the interests of comparability 
between the cross-sectional and panel results. In addition, to ensure consistency with the sample restrictions in the 
cross-section, the panel dataset also excludes observations for which either equity FPI or FDI holdings are less than 
US$5 million.   12
investors exceed (on average) the FDI holdings of US firms; the mean ratio of equity FPI to FDI 
among these countries is 2.25.
18 As Figure 1 demonstrates, this ratio varies considerably, even 
for countries of similar levels of economic development.  
A simple comparison of the ratio of equity FPI to FDI across corporate tax rate and 
investor protection regimes provides a descriptive perspective on the effects hypothesized in 
Section 2. Figure 2 illustrates how this ratio varies with corporate tax rates and investor 
protections.
19  In Figure 2a, the two pairs of columns provide the mean ratio for subsamples 
divided at the median corporate tax and the median level of investor protections. For low-tax 
countries, the mean ratio is 2.82, whereas it is only 1.51 for high-tax countries. The difference 
across investor protection levels is smaller, but nonetheless substantial: countries with higher 
levels of investor protection have a mean ratio of 2.48, while those with lower levels of investor 
protection have a mean ratio of 2.03. Figure 2b illustrates the joint effects of these two factors: 
countries with both low tax rates and strong investor protection have a considerably higher ratio 
of equity FPI to FDI (a mean ratio exceeding 3) than do countries with neither of these 
characteristics (a mean ratio of 1.37), with countries that have only one of these features falling 
in between. While these figures are only suggestive, they are consistent with the hypotheses 
outlined in Section 2. 
3.2. Empirical  Specification 
  The basic empirical specification used for the cross-sectional analysis is: 
Log of Equity FPIi = β0 + β1τi + β2Invi + β3(Log of FDIi) + Xiγ + εi           (6) 
The dependent variable is the log of equity FPI in country i, i.e. the log of the holdings of 
equities in country i by US investors in 2005, measured in millions of US$. The two independent 
variables of interest are the corporate tax rate in country i (τi) and the investor protection index 
for country i (Invi). The log of US FDI in country i in 2005 is included as an independent 
variable to ensure that the analysis focuses on variations in equity FPI holdings relative to FDI. 
The specification in Equation (6) imposes the restriction that the log of equity FPI and the log of 
                                                 
18 Finland appears to be an outlier in Figure 1, with an exceptionally large ratio of equity FPI to FDI. The results in 
the paper are robust to the exclusion of Finland. 
19 The correlation coefficient between the corporate tax rate and the investor protection index in this sample is 
approximately -0.1, so there are a substantial number of countries that have favorable characteristics by one measure 
but not the other.   13
FDI are linearly related, and explains deviations from this linear relationship using the other 
independent variables. This functional form may be too restrictive in some circumstances, but 
allowing the FDI variable to enter Equation (6) nonlinearly using various formulations does not 
affect the basic results. 
  A variety of other independent variables are included to address the possibility that FDI 
and equity FPI are simultaneously determined. If there are omitted explanatory variables that 
determine both FPI and FDI, then it is possible that the FDI variable and the error term εi may be 
correlated, potentially biasing the estimated coefficients in Equation (6). Ideally, this problem 
could be addressed through the estimation of a set of simultaneous equations, but this would 
require credible exclusion restrictions that are not readily available. In addition to the extensive 
set of controls to absorb the potential correlation between FDI and εi, an alternative specification 
that instead models the log of the ratio of equity FPI to FDI is used in robustness checks: 
Log of (Equity FPIi/FDIi)= β0 + β1τi + β2Invi + Xiγ + εi            (7) 
As the FDI variable does not appear on the right-hand side, there is no possibility of correlation 
between the explanatory variables and εi due to simultaneity between FPI and FDI.  This 
specification also has the virtue of examining the relative use of FDI and FPI most directly.  
Unfortunately, this specification is restrictive as it is equivalent to imposing the restriction on 
Equation (6) that the coefficient of the log of FDI is 1.  As discussed below, the specification in 
Equation (7) leads to results that are highly consistent with those from Equation (6). 
Xi is a vector of control variables used in Equations (6) and (7). The log of country i’s 
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and the log of country i’s population 
provide basic information about country i’s affluence and size. To capture the extent of 
diversification benefits, the correlation between country i’s annual economic growth rate and the 
growth rate of the US over the period 1950-2004 is included; the lower this correlation, the 
greater the diversification of US-specific risk. Two “gravity” variables capture the proximity of 
country i to the US. One is the physical distance between the largest cities of country i and the 
US, weighted by the cities’ shares in the countries’ populations. The other is an indicator 
variable for contiguous countries (i.e. Canada and Mexico).
20 In addition, Xi includes regional 
                                                 
20 GDP and population are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The correlation of 
growth rates is computed using data in the Penn World Tables. The distance and contiguity measures are from the   14
dummies to capture region-specific effects.
21 A number of other control variables are used in 
robustness checks, as described in Section 4 below. 
  The empirical specification for the longitudinal analysis is: 
Log of Equity FPIit = β1τit + β2(Log of FDIit) + Xitγ  + µi + νt + µi*(t – 2000) + εit         (8) 
The dependent variable is the log of equity FPI held by US investors in country i in year t, 
measured in millions of US$. This analysis is restricted to those years for which FPI data are 
available. The independent variable of interest is the corporate tax rate in country i in year t (τit).  
The log of US FDI in country i in year t is included as an independent variable, both to focus on 
variations in equity FPI holdings relative to FDI and to control for changes in otherwise 
unobserved country characteristics that affect the desirability of investment (in any form) in 
country i in year t. Xit is a vector of time-varying control variables that are discussed more fully 
in Section 5 below.    
The specification also includes a country fixed effect (µi) and year effects (νt). The former 
captures unobserved factors affecting equity FPI in a given country that are fixed over time. Note 
that investor protections would be incorporated into the country fixed effect in this specification. 
The year effect captures common shocks to equity FPI that affect all countries. In addition, 
however, it is possible that different countries may experience different growth rates over time in 
US equity FPI. This is captured by country-specific time trends, implemented here through 
interactions between the country dummies and the years, with 2000 being used as the base year.  
4.    Taxes, Investor Protections and Equity FPI 
4.1. Cross-Country  Results   
The basic results from the cross-sectional analysis are presented in Table 2. The first step 
is to establish the robustness of the effect of the corporate tax rate in a broad sample of countries. 
Column 1 reports the results of a specification that excludes the investor protection index, but is 
otherwise similar to Equation (6). The sample in Column 1 is not restricted to the baseline set of 
countries listed in the Data Appendix. In this wider sample, the corporate tax rate has a negative 
                                                                                                                                                             
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationale (CEPII) dataset (available on Thierry Mayer’s 
website at: http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/data/data.htm). These variables are described more fully in 
the Data Appendix. 
21 These are for Europe and Central Asia, Asia and the Pacific, the Americas, and the Middle East and North Africa, 
with Africa as the omitted category.   15
effect on equity FPI holdings by US investors, but it is only of borderline significance. This 
larger sample includes many countries for which both equity FPI and FDI are very small. This 
potentially gives rise to a large amount of random variation in the relative values of equity FPI 
and FDI, and hence to imprecision in the estimated effect. Restricting the sample to the 44 
baseline countries leads to a larger and highly significant effect of the corporate tax rate, as 
shown in Column 2. 
  The results from the baseline specification in Equation (6) are shown in Column 3 of 
Table 2. As in Column 2, equity FPI holdings by US investors, controlling for the FDI holdings 
of US firms, are substantially larger in countries with lower corporate tax rates.
22  Moreover, this 
effect is robust to controlling for variations in investor protection across countries. The estimated 
coefficient of -0.07 implies an elasticity of equity FPI with respect to the corporate tax rate of 
approximately -2.1. Thus, a 10% reduction in a country’s corporate tax rate (e.g. from 35% to 
31.5%) would be predicted to lead to a 21% increase in the value of equity held by US investors. 
This is a much larger elasticity than has typically been estimated in the literature on the 
responsiveness of FDI to tax rates.
23 This result suggests that US investors use FPI to bypass the 
worldwide tax regime facing US multinational firms. The results in Column 3 of Table 2 also 
show that equity FPI, relative to FDI, is significantly larger in countries with stronger investor 
protection. The statistically significant estimated coefficient of approximately 1.1 implies that a 
one standard deviation increase in the index - approximately equivalent to the difference between 
Italy and Norway - is associated with a 24% increase in equity FPI holdings by US investors.  
A potential omitted variable in the baseline specification in Column 3 is the extent of 
firms’ access to debt financing. The availability of debt finance from either foreign or domestic 
sources may be a substitute for issuing equity and so reduce US equity FPI holdings. To address 
this issue, two new variables are added in Column 4. The log of debt FPI (also from the TIC 
dataset) captures the availability of debt finance from US sources to foreign firms and can also 
serve as a proxy for unobserved country characteristics that may influence both debt and equity 
                                                 
22 The corporate tax rate variable in the reported results is from the University of Michigan’s Worldwide Tax 
Database, and is for 2002 (the latest available year). The results are essentially identical when using more recent tax 
rates (for 2004) from the PriceWaterhouseCoopers data. 
23 Early studies of FDI, reviewed in Hines (1999), found a tax elasticity of approximately -0.6. More recent 
estimates have been larger; for instance, Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) report an elasticity of -1.5 using data on FDI 
by US firms. Nonetheless, although there are some higher estimates (e.g. Altshuler and Grubert, 2004), most studies 
find that the elasticity of FDI with respect to corporate tax rates is smaller than the estimate in Column 3 of Table 2.   16
FPI. In addition, a country’s financial depth - measured by the ratio of financial deposits to GDP, 
and obtained from an updated version of the Beck et al. (2000) database - serves as an indicator 
of the availability of domestic debt financing from that country’s banking sector. As shown in 
Column 4, adding these variables does not affect the main results. 
The basic results in Column 3 are also robust to the inclusion of a variety of additional 
controls. The quality of a country’s governance institutions – such as the extent of judicial 
independence and the enforcement of property rights – may play a role in investment decisions, 
and may influence the relative attractiveness of FPI and FDI. Thus, an overall index of the 
quality of a country’s governance institutions, constructed by Kauffmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2005), is included in the specification in Column 5. Since the extent of a country’s 
communications infrastructure may affect investment levels the number of telephone mainlines 
in the country (from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)) is included in the 
specification in Column 5. The amount of FPI may also depend mechanically on a country’s 
trade deficit; this is controlled for using the values of exports and imports relative to GDP (also 
obtained from WDI). Finally, cultural and linguistic familiarity may lead to greater investment 
(and perhaps reduce the desire for control through FDI). Thus, an indicator variable for the use of 
English as an official language is also included. As is shown in Column 5, the basic results are 
robust to the inclusion of all these variables. 
The results are also robust to the inclusion of various other controls not reported in Table 
2. First, natural resource abundance may induce greater FDI and potentially confound the results. 
However, adding a measure of the value of countries’ subsoil assets (from World Bank (2006)) 
does not affect the results. Second, US investors have historically faced the same personal tax 
rate t
US
P on the returns from equity holdings, regardless of which country their investments are 
located in. However, the 2003 US tax reform introduced a distinction between countries based on 
whether dividends paid by their resident corporations to US individuals qualified for the lower 
dividend tax rate of 15%. Adding an indicator variable for those countries to which the lower 
dividend rate applies does not change the basic results.
24   Finally, adding the withholding tax 
                                                 
24 Qualification is based on the nature of the country’s tax treaty with the US. The affected countries are defined as 
those listed in IRS Notice 2003-69 (“United States Income Tax Treaties That Meet the Requirements of Section 
1(h)(11)(C)(i)(II)”), but excluding those listed countries that impose withholding taxes on US investors’ dividends at 
a rate greater than 15% (based on the information in Anderson (2006, Chart 9.1)).   17
rates on dividends imposed by foreign countries (which would be important to tax-exempt US 
investors) leads to similar results.
25  
4.2. Robustness  checks 
  If variables that influence both FPI and FDI have been omitted in the previous 
specifications, as suggested above, a specification using the ratio of FPI to FDI as a dependent 
variable (Equation (7)) may be preferable. Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results from 
estimating Equation (7). The basic results from Table 2 are robust to using this specification. The 
corporate tax rate effect remains negative and significant, while the investor protection index has 
a coefficient of substantial magnitude, though it is only of borderline significance. Overall, the 
results using Equation (7) are consistent with those from Equation (6), suggesting that the basic 
results are not substantially affected by simultaneity between FPI and FDI. 
  It is possible that the results in Table 2 are driven by unobserved heterogeneity across 
investment climates in a way that is not captured by any of the control variables used in the 
analysis. One approach to addressing this issue is to investigate whether regressions where debt 
FPI is substituted for equity FPI yield similar results.  If the results are similar for debt FPI, then 
unobserved heterogeneity could explain these findings on equity FPI. Alternatively, under the 
hypotheses developed in Section 2, the desirability of debt FPI should be unrelated to both 
corporate tax rates and the strength of investor protection. The measure of investor protections is 
oriented around protections specifically available to equity investors, so this variable should not 
have an effect on debt FPI. Column 2 of Table 3 reports the results of the specification in 
Equation (6) but using debt FPI as the dependent variable: 
Log of Debt FPIi = β0 + β1τi + β2Invi + β3(Log of FDIi) + Xiγ + εi            (9) 
Using the baseline set of controls, neither the tax rate nor the investor protection index have an 
effect on debt FPI that is statistically significant and the coefficients are relatively small. The 
(unreported) results are very similar when the full set of controls is included.
26 The absence of 
any effect for debt FPI suggests that the results in Table 2 are indeed attributable to tax rates and 
investor protection, as opposed to some omitted variable. 
                                                 
25 Note that the sample size is substantially reduced by missing data for this variable. 
26 The latter specification includes controls for general governance quality, so it addresses the potential concern that 
debtholders’ rights and equityholders’ rights may be correlated.   18
  A more general approach to addressing concerns about omitted correlated variables and 
about reverse causality is to use an instrumental variables specification. La Porta et al. (2006) 
argue that the historical origins of countries’ systems of commercial law are valid instruments for 
their investor protection index. Dharmapala and Hines (2006, Table 7) find that these legal 
origins are also a significant determinant of countries’ corporate tax rates. Drawing on these 
findings, the instrumental variables approach in Table 3 uses countries’ legal origins, latitude and 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization (from La Porta et al. (1999)) as instruments for their tax rates 
and their values of the investor protection index.
27 
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the results from the IV estimation of Equation (6). It shows 
that the basic results from Table 2 are robust; the corporate tax rate and investor protection 
effects remain significant, and their magnitudes are larger than those found in Table 2 using OLS 
estimation. However, the exclusion restriction - that the instruments do not affect equity FPI 
other than through tax rates and investor protections - may be questioned. For instance, the effect 
of the instruments may operate through their relationship to countries’ general governance 
environments, rather than specifically through tax rates and protections for minority 
shareholders. Alternatively, British legal origins may be correlated with the use of the English 
language, and it may be language (rather than taxes or corporate governance) that induces US 
investment.
28 Nonetheless, the IV results are similar when conditioning on the full set of controls 
(Column 4 of Table 3); in particular, this specification includes an overall measure of a country’s 
current governance quality, and a control for the use of English an official language. The 
exclusion restriction can more reasonably be expected to be satisfied, conditional on this 
extensive set of controls. In general, notwithstanding these caveats about the IV approach, it is 
reassuring that it yields results consistent with the OLS results.  
5.   Panel Results 
  The IV estimates described above provide some reassurance that the basic results are not 
driven by unobserved heterogeneity. They also address the potential problem of reverse 
causality. Another approach to addressing unobserved heterogeneity, described in this section, is 
                                                 
27 These instruments are jointly significant in the first-stage regressions. 
28 It may also be argued that having the same (i.e. British) legal origins facilitates more US investment. However, it 
is not entirely clear that it should lead to more FPI, relative to FDI; indeed, control may be more valuable to US 
multinationals in a more familiar legal environment.   19
to use panel data to focus on within-country variation over time in the corporate tax rate. This 
approach cannot be used to analyze the effects of investor protections, as investor protections 
change only infrequently over the sample period.
29 In the following panel results, the investor 
protection effect is absorbed in the country fixed effects included in Equation (8). The control 
variables are similarly restricted to those that are time–varying: the log of US FDI, the log of 
GDP per capita, the log of population, the log of aggregate stock market capitalization, the log of 
long-term US debt FPI,
30 financial depth, exports and imports relative to GDP, and an indicator 
variable for those country-years for which the lower dividend tax rate enacted in 2003 was 
applicable. 
  It is important to note that possible alternative explanations for the tax result relate not 
simply to unobserved heterogeneity across countries, but also to differential growth rates or 
trends in FPI across subsets of countries. For example, observed tax rates may be the outcome of 
a process of tax competition. In models where a “race to the bottom” occurs, all countries may 
reduce their tax rates, without affecting the equilibrium location of investment. In itself, such a 
process would merely create a bias against finding any tax effect. It is possible, however, that tax 
competition and the potential growth in investment flows only apply among a subset of 
countries. For these countries, a pattern of falling tax rates and growing FPI may be observed, 
but the relationship between the two variables would be spurious. More generally, US FPI has 
grown rapidly in recent years, and this growth may have been targeted towards particular 
countries (independently of their tax rates); year effects would not fully account for this 
phenomenon. Another possible explanation relates to the nontax motivations for FDI discussed 
in Section 2. If synergies between US firms and their overseas counterparts happen to have 
grown most rapidly in countries that have also increased their tax rates this would have led to 
increased FDI (and hence reduced equity FPI, relative to FDI) in these countries, and hence to a 
spurious relationship between taxes and FPI. 
                                                 
29 To the extent that changes in corporate governance institutions and securities laws (such as those in India 
analyzed by Black and Khanna (2007)) may have occurred, their effects would be substantially controlled for 
through the inclusion of the log of aggregate market capitalization (obtained from the World Bank’s WDI database) 
as a control variable. 
30 The cross-sectional analysis used total debt FPI (i.e. the sum of short-term and long-term debt). However, short-
term debt is only reported for years from 2001, so to ensure consistency in definition over time, the longitudinal 
analysis uses only long-term debt FPI.   20
  To address these concerns, the panel specification in Equation (8) includes country-
specific time trends, in addition to country and year effects. The results are reported in Table 4. 
Column 1 begins with a simple specification that includes country and year fixed effects, but no 
control variables or country-specific time trends. Using this simple specification, increases in the 
corporate tax rate are associated with significant decreases in US equity FPI holdings. The 
specification in Column 2 adds the full set of controls and country-specific time trends. Here, 
using only within-country variation in corporate tax rates, and controlling for other relevant 
factors and for country-specific time trends, reductions in corporate tax rates are associated with 
significant increases in equity FPI, relative to FDI. The magnitude of the effect is smaller in the 
panel results, but these results confirm the negative effect of corporate tax rates on equity FPI, 
relative to FDI, found in the cross-sectional analysis. 
To test whether the results in Table 4 are driven by unobserved changes over time that are 
not captured by the year effects nor by the country-specific time trends, a variant of the debt FPI 
test used in Section 4 can be used. If these unobserved changes are driving the observed tax rate 
effect, then they should also be expected to affect debt FPI (even though debt FPI should be 
unaffected by tax rates per se). This test uses the following specification: 
Log of Long-term Debt FPIit = β1τit + β2(Log of FDIit) + Xitγ + µi + νt + µi*(t – 2000) + εit    (10) 
The results are shown in Column 3 of Table 4. While the estimated tax effect is negative, it is not 
close to statistical significance, unlike the tax effect in Columns 1 and 2, where the dependent 
variable is equity FPI. This test provides some reassurance that the estimated effect of corporate 
tax rate changes on equity FPI is not driven by unobserved shocks to a country’s general 
investment climate. 
6.   Conclusion 
  The composition of outbound U.S. capital flows reflects the responses of investors to 
home and host country institutional regimes.  With respect to taxation, the worldwide system of 
taxation vitiates the role of multinational firms in providing access to global diversification 
opportunities: worldwide taxation results in FPI being a favored diversification vehicle, 
particularly in low-tax countries. On the other hand, investors seeking to access diversification 
opportunities in countries with weak investor protections are attracted by the control associated   21
with FDI via US multinational firms.  In both cases, institutional regimes alter the choices 
undertaken by investors seeking to enjoy the benefits of global diversification.  
These results open up several new lines of inquiry into the distortionary effects of 
taxation and investor protections on firm behavior and on portfolio allocation decisions. If the 
effects documented here translate into differences between foreign-owned and locally-owned 
firms in the cost of capital, then both types of regimes could influence the competitive dynamics 
between foreign and local firms.  If the responsiveness of portfolio choices to corporate taxes 
extends to the choice of domestic versus foreign investment, then the U.S. corporate tax may 
give rise to substantial distortions in investors’ international portfolio choices.  Finally, the 
distortion to portfolio choices induced by corporate taxes suggests that welfare analyses of 
corporate taxation in a global setting should incorporate this new margin of distortion.        22
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Source: Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting system, available at: 
www.treas.gov/tic/ 
These data represent the portfolio holdings of foreign securities by US investors as of December 31 of 
each of the following years: 1994, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005. The TIC dataset is based on a series 
of surveys of banks, other financial institutions, brokers, and dealers undertaken by the US Treasury; see 
the website or Bertaut, Griever and Tryon (2006) for more details. The TIC data are divided into equity 
FPI, long-term debt FPI (with an original maturity of over one year), and short-term debt FPI (the last 
variable is only available for the years 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005). The panel dataset uses the equity FPI 
and long-term debt FPI measures for the years 1994, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005; the cross-




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); available at: 
http://www.bea.gov 
The measure of FDI is the “direct investment position, on a historical cost basis” (in millions of US$) of 
US firms in each country in a given year. The panel dataset uses this measure for the years 1994, 1997, 
2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005; the cross-sectional dataset uses the measure for 2005 only. 
 
Corporate Tax Rates: 
Source: the World Tax Database maintained by the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of 
Michigan, available at:  
http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/ 
The cross-sectional dataset uses the top statutory corporate tax rate for 2002 (the latest available year). 
The panel dataset uses top statutory corporate tax rates from an alternative source, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ Worldwide Summaries of corporate taxation for each of the years that the FPI 
data are available. 
 
Investor Protection Index: 
Source: La Porta et al. (2006) 
The principal component of three indices – of disclosure requirements, liability rules and anti-director 
rights – constructed by Porta et al. (2006). The index takes on values from 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating stronger investor protection. 
 
GDP per capita: 
Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), available at http://econ.worldbank.org 
GDP per capita is expressed in US$, in PPP terms. The cross-sectional dataset uses GDP per capita for 
2004. The panel dataset uses GDP per capita for each of the years that the FPI data are available. The 
GDP per capita variable is expressed in nominal rather than real terms, but the panel specification 
includes year effects.  
 
Population: 
Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), available at http://econ.worldbank.org  
The cross-sectional dataset uses the population in 2004. The panel dataset uses the population for each of 
the years that the FPI data are available. 
 
Correlation with US Growth Rate: 
Source: calculated from data in the Penn World Tables, available at:   25
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
This variable represents the correlation coefficient between each country’s annual economic growth rate 
and that of the US over the period 1950-2004. 
 
Distance from the US: 
Source: the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationale (CEPII) dataset, available on 
Thierry Mayer’s website at:  
http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/data/data.htm 
This is a measure of the physical distance of each country in the dataset from the US. It represents the 
distance in km between Washington, DC and the capital (or largest city) in the country, weighted by the 
fraction of the country’s population that lives in the capital (or largest city). 
 
Contiguity: 
Source: the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationale (CEPII) dataset, available on 
Thierry Mayer’s website at:  
http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/data/data.htm 
An indicator variable that = 1 for Canada and Mexico, and = 0 for all other countries. 
 
Ratio of Financial Deposits to GDP: 
Source: an updated version (January 17, 2007) of the financial dataset in Beck et al. (2000), available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/tbeck 
This variable represents deposits in deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share of 
GDP (see Beck et al. (2000) for more details) in 2004 (for the cross-sectional dataset), and for each year 
for which FPI data is available (for the panel dataset). 
 
Country Governance Index: 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) 
This index is obtained by taking the (unweighted) mean of the 6 governance measures – for “voice and 
accountability,” “political stability,” “government effectiveness,” “regulatory quality,” “rule of law,” and 
“control of corruption” - constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2005) for the year 2004. The methodology 
(described in detail in Kaufmann et al. (2005)) involves using principal components analysis on a large 
number of existing measures. The index is a continuous variable over the approximate interval (-2.5, 2.5), 
normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 (across all countries and territories), with higher 
values indicating better governance. 
 
Telephone Mainlines: 
Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), available at http://econ.worldbank.org 
The number of telephone mainline connections in the country in 2004 (for missing 2004 data, 2002 data 
are used instead, when available). WDI reports the number of telephone lines per 1000 population, but in 
Tables 2 and 3, the telephone lines variable is scaled by area. 
 
Exports as a % of GDP and Imports as a % of GDP: 
Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), available at http://econ.worldbank.org 
The value of exports and imports for each country, both expressed as percentages of the country’s GDP. 
The cross-sectional dataset uses these percentages for 2004. The panel dataset uses these percentages for 
each of the years that the FPI data are available. 
 
Use of English as an Official Language: 
Source: based on information in the CEPII dataset (available on Thierry Mayer’s website) 
Indicator variable (= 1) if English is listed as one of the country’s official languages, and 0 otherwise 
(note that the CEPII dataset lists up to 3 official languages for each country).   26
 
 
Aggregate Market Capitalization: 
Source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), available at http://econ.worldbank.org 
Aggregate market capitalization is expressed in US$. The cross-sectional dataset uses aggregate market 
capitalization for 2004. The panel dataset uses aggregate market capitalization for each of the years that 
the FPI data are available. The aggregate market capitalization variable is expressed in nominal rather 
than real terms, but the panel specification includes year effects. 
 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization: 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
This is defined as the average value of 5 different indices of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization; the 
values range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater heterogeneity. See La Porta et al. (1999, p. 
238) for more details. 
 
Latitude: 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
The absolute value of the country’s latitude, scaled to lie in the interval [0, 1]. 
 
Legal Origins: 
Source: La Porta et al. (1999) 
Indicator variables for each of 5 origins of the country’s commercial law: British, French, German, 
Scandinavian, and Socialist. The sample of countries used in this paper does not include any with 




Source: the CEPII dataset (available on Thierry Mayer’s website); area, measured in square km. 
 
Tax Haven Status:  
Source: Dharmapala and Hines (2006) 
Indicator variable (=1 if the country appears on the list of tax havens in Dharmapala and Hines (2006, 
Table 1, Column 3) and 0 otherwise. 
 
Subsoil Assets: 
Source: World Bank (2006, Appendix 2) 
The value of the stocks of subsoil mineral assets (oil, gas and coal, together with 10 metals and minerals - 
bauxite, copper, gold, iron ore, lead, nickel, phosphate rock, silver, tin, and zinc) per capita in US$ for the 
year 2000 (see World Bank (2006, p. 147) for more details). 
 
Personal Tax Rate Variables: 
Source: based on IRS Notice 2003-69 (“United States Income Tax Treaties That Meet the Requirements 
of Section 1(h)(11)(C)(i)(II)”), available at: 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2003-42_IRB/ar09.html 
and on Anderson (2006, Ch. 9) 
In the cross-sectional dataset, this is an indicator variable (= 1 for those countries listed in the IRS Notice 
as having a tax treaty with the US that satisfies the requirements for that country’s corporations’ 
dividends to receive favorable treatment (i.e. the 15% rate) under the Jobs, Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA2003). However, those countries on the list that impose withholding 
taxes > 15% on dividends to US shareholders are excluded (based on the withholding tax rates in   27
Anderson (2006, Chart 9.1). The withholding tax rate is defined as the tax rate imposed by each foreign 
country on dividends paid by its resident corporations to their US shareholders. 
In the panel dataset, the personal tax rate variable is an interaction between the indicator variable 




Source: World Bank classifications; regions are Europe and Central Asia, Asia/Pacific, Americas, Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), and Africa. 
 
List of Countries in the Sample: 
Note: this list of 44 countries is based on the set of 49 countries with the largest aggregate stock market 
capitalization in 1993 (La Porta et al. (2006)). From this set, it excludes: 
- the US 
- Nigeria (for which FPI data are missing) 
- Jordan, Kenya, and Uruguay (which have either US equity FPI or FDI holdings of less than US$5 
million in 2005)  
This leaves the following set of countries:  
 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea 
(South), Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, Venezuela, Zimbabwe 
 
The panel dataset is restricted to the same set of countries. In addition, country-year observations for these 
countries where either US equity FPI or FDI holdings are less than US$5 million are omitted. 
 Note: This figure presents the ratio of U.S. outbound FPI to FDI in 2005 for the countries analyzed in La Porta et al. (2006), except for countries with FDI or FPI lower than $5mm. 





















































































































































































































































































































































Note: The figures provide mean ratios of outbound U.S. FPI to FDI for subsamples of countries displayed in Figure 1.  In Figure 2a, the two 
pairs of bars provide ratios for two pairs subsamples divided at the median corporate tax rate and the median level of investor protections. 
In Figure 2b, the sample of countries is divided into four subsamples at the median corporate tax rate and median level of investor 
protections.  












































































IVariable Mean St. Dev. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Obs.
Log of US Equity FPI 9.495           2.367           44 8.966       2.245       256
Log of US Debt FPI 8.551           2.053           44
Log of US Long-Term Debt FPI 8.418           1.977           44 8.074       2.049       256
Log of US FDI 9.376           1.836           44 9.101       1.693       248
Log of the Ratio of US Equity FPI to US FDI 0.119           1.291           44
Corporate Tax Rate 29.950         7.160           44 30.100     6.951       256
Investor Protection Index 0.470           0.222           44
Log of GDP per capita (PPP) 9.568           0.891           44 9.470       0.861       249
Log of Population 17.090         1.261           44 17.070     1.273       250
Correlation with US Growth Rate 0.170           0.183           44
Weighted Distance from the US 9424.6 3577.4 44
Contiguous (=1) 0.045           0.211           44
Ratio of Financial Deposits to GDP 0.836           0.540           43 0.667       0.409       248
Log of Aggregate Market Capitalization 25.910         1.745           43 25.460     1.709       249
Country Governance Index 0.649           0.973           44
Telephone Mainlines (scaled by area) 17.540         112.500       43
Exports as a % of GDP 41.550         31.440         42 38.220     28.950     213
Imports as a % of GDP 38.960         28.760         42 36.920     26.760     213
English as an Official Language (=1) 0.295           0.462           44
Lower Dividend Tax Rate (=1) 0.591           0.497           44 0.301       0.459       256
British Legal Origins 0.341           0.479           44
French Legal Origins 0.432           0.501           44
German Legal Origins 0.136           0.347           44
Scandinavian Legal Origins 0.091           0.291           44
Latitude (absolute value) 0.357           0.208           44
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index 0.241           0.232           44
Cross-Sectional Dataset Panel Dataset
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Note: Equity FPI is a measure of the portfolio holdings of foreign equities by US investors at the end of 2005 (cross-section) and at the end of 1994, 1997, 
2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005 (panel). Debt FPI is a measure of the portfolio holdings of debt (both long-term and short-term) by US investors at the end of 
2005. Long-term debt FPI is a measure of the portfolio holdings of debt (with an original maturity of over one year) by US investors at the end of 1994, 
1997, 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005. FDI is the direct investment position in millions of US$ of US firms for 2005 (cross-section) and each year for which 
FPI data is available (panel). The ratio of equity FPI to FDI uses the equity FPI and FDI variables defined above for 2005. The corporate tax rate is the top 
statutory corporate tax rate. The investor protection index is the principal component of three indices constructed by La Porta et al. (2006). GDP per capita, 
from the World Bank’s WDI database, is expressed in US$ in PPP terms. Population is from the World Bank’s WDI database. The correlation with the US 
growth rate is the correlation coefficient between each country’s annual economic growth rate and that of the US over the period 1950 to 2004. Weighted
distance from the US is from the CEPII dataset. The indicator for contiguous status (from CEPII) is = 1 for Canada and Mexico. The ratio of financial 
deposits to GDP is from an updated version of Beck et al. (2000). Aggregate market capitalization is from the World Bank’s WDI database. The country 
governance index is from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). The number of telephone mainlines is from the World Bank’s WDI database. Exports 
and imports as a % of GDP is from the World Bank’s WDI database. The English language variable (from CEPII) is an indicator variable (= 1) if English is 
listed as one of the country’s official languages. The dividend tax rate variable (based on IRS Notice 2003-69 and Anderson (2006)) is an indicator = 1 for 
countries or country-years to which the lower rates under the 2003 tax reform applied. Legal origins, latitude and the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index 
are from La Porta et al. (1999).Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corporate Tax Rate -0.063 * -0.070 *** -0.070 *** -0.060 *** -0.070 ***
(0.036) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Investor Protection Index 1.077 ** 1.038 ** 1.150 **
-0.409 (0.418) (0.481)
Log of US FDI 0.760 *** 0.304 *** 0.259 ** 0.277 * 0.326 *
(0.160) (0.102) (0.105) (0.138) (0.168)
Log of GDP per capita (PPP) 2.110 *** 2.206 *** 2.277 *** 2.242 *** 1.681 ***
(0.478) (0.240) (0.239) (0.311) (0.383)
Log of Population 0.629 ** 1.035 *** 1.086 *** 1.059 *** 1.116 ***
(0.295) (0.115) (0.103) (0.110) (0.131)
Correlation with US Growth Rate -0.949 -0.811 -1.244 ** -1.132 * -1.454 *
(1.227) (0.523) (0.526) (0.623) (0.737)
Weighted Distance from the US 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Contiguous (=1) 1.831 ** 2.083 *** 2.046 *** 2.023 *** 1.483 ***
(0.814) (0.402) (0.344) (0.387) (0.514)
Log of US Debt FPI  0.014 0.011
(0.110) (0.099)
Ratio of Financial Deposits to GDP -0.209 -0.267
(0.251) (0.342)
Country Governance Index 0.633 *
(0.328)
Telephone Mainlines (scaled by area) 0.002 ***
0.000
Exports as a % of GDP 0.014
(0.015)
Imports as a % of GDP -0.012
(0.018)
English as an Official Language (=1) -0.258
(0.287)
Constant -26.425 *** -29.241 *** -30.428 *** -29.723 *** -24.769 ***
(7.015) (4.010) (3.842) (4.442) (4.425)
Regional Dummies? YYYYY
Observations 99 44 44 43 42
R-squared 0.8 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98
Table 2: Taxes, Investor Protections and FPI
Log of US Equity FPI
Note: The dependent variable is the log of US equity FPI in 2005. The corporate tax rate is the top statutory corporate rate in 2002. The investor protection 
index is the principal component of the disclosure, liability and anti-director rights indices from La Porta et al. (2006). The log of US FDI is the log of the 
direct investment position of US firms in 2005. Log of GDP per capita (in US$, in PPP terms) is from the World Bank’s WDI database, for 2004. Log of 
population is from the World Bank’s WDI database, for 2004. Correlation with US growth rate is the correlation coefficient of annual economic growth rates 
with those for the US over the period 1950-2004, calculated from data in the Penn World Tables. Weighted distance from the US is a measure of physical 
distance (in km) of a country’s capital city from Washington DC.  Contiguous is an indicator=1 for Canada and Mexico, and 0 otherwise. Log of US 
debt FPI is for 2005. The ratio of financial deposits to GDP is from an updated version of Beck et al. (2000), for 2004. The country governance index is the 
unweighted mean of the 6 indices constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). Telephone mainlines is the number of telephone mainline 
connections in the country in 2004, from the World Bank’s WDI database. Exports and imports as a % of GDP are from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
English as an official language is an indicator = 1 if English is listed as one of the country’s official languages, and 0 otherwise. Regional dummies are 
indicators for Europe and Central Asia, Asia and the Pacific, the Americas, and the Middle East and North Africa, with Africa as the omitted category. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.Dependent Variable:
Corporate Tax Rate -0.048 ** 0.011 -0.120 ** -0.098 **
(0.018) (0.035) (0.055) (0.042)
Investor Protection Index 1.045 * 0.330 1.988 ** 2.951
(0.551) (0.909) (0.967) (1.755)
Log of US FDI 0.715 *** 0.146 0.232
(0.140) (0.181) (0.222)
Log of GDP per capita (PPP) 1.398 *** 0.961 ** 2.385 *** 1.951 ***
(0.483) (0.439) (0.315) (0.443)
Log of Population 0.798 *** 0.116 1.236 *** 1.099 ***
(0.137) (0.173) (0.214) (0.137)
Correlation with US Growth Rate -1.021 -0.575 -2.001 * -2.145 *
(0.843) (1.317) (1.016) (1.157)
Weighted Distance from the US -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 *
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Contiguous (=1) 0.495 -0.475 2.614 *** 2.351 **
(0.493) (0.564) (0.830) (1.081)
Log of US Debt FPI  -0.349 *** 0.048
(0.106) (0.160)
Ratio of Financial Deposits to GDP -1.170 ** 0.048
(0.473) (0.538)
Country Governance Index 0.779 * 0.202
(0.424) (0.527)
Telephone Mainlines 0.002 *** 0.002 **
(0.001) (0.001)
Exports as a % of GDP -0.014 0.018
(0.017) (0.022)
Imports as a % of GDP 0.020 -0.023
(0.018) (0.026)
English as an Official Language (=1) -0.659 ** -0.650
(0.290) (0.605)
Constant -18.297 ** -9.191 -31.298 ** -25.368 **
(5.516) (5.761) (4.359) (4.219)
Regional Dummies? Y Y Y Y
Observations 42 44 44 42
R-squared 0.85 0.83  
Log of the Ratio of 
US Equity FPI to 
US FDI
Log of US Debt 
FPI
Log of US Equity 
FPI
Log of US Equity 
FPI
Note: The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of the ratio of US equity FPI to FDI in 2005. The dependent variable is the log of US debt FPI in 
column 2 and the log of US equity FPI in columns 3 and 4.  The specifications in columns 1 and 2 are OLS and the specifications in columns 3 and 4 
use legal origins, latitude, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization as instrumental variables for the corporate tax rate and the investor protection index. The 
corporate tax rate is the top statutory corporate rate in 2002. The investor protection index is the principal component of the disclosure, liability and 
anti-director rights indices from La Porta et al. (2006). The log of US FDI is the log of the direct investment position of US firms in 2005. Log of GDP 
per capita (in US$, in PPP terms) is from the World Bank’s WDI database, for 2004. Log of population is from the World Bank’s WDI database, for 
2004. Correlation with US growth rate is the correlation coefficient of annual economic growth rates with those for the US over the period 1950-2004, 
calculated from data in the Penn World Tables. Weighted distance from the US is a measure of physical distance of a country’s capital city from
Table 3: Robustness Checks and IV Results 
OLS Estimates IV Estimates
Washington DC.  Contiguous is an indicator=1 for Canada and Mexico. Log of US debt FPI is for 2005. The ratio of financial deposits to GDP is from 
an updated version of Beck et al. (2000), for 2004. The country governance index is constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). 
Telephone mainlines is drawn from the World Bank’s WDI database. Exports and imports as a % of GDP are from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
English as an official language is an indicator=1 if English is listed as one of the country’s official languages. Regional dummies are indicators for 
Europe and Central Asia, Asia and the Pacific, the Americas, and the Middle East and North Africa, with Africa as the omitted category. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)Dependent Variable:
Corporate Tax Rate -0.038 ** -0.026 ** -0.025
(0.019) (0.011) (0.039)
Log of US FDI -0.176 -0.026
(0.234) (0.361)
Log of GDP per capita (PPP) 1.820 2.529
(1.677) (1.854)
Log of Population 2.046 4.284 **
(2.044) (1.949)
Log of Aggregate Market Capitalization 0.614 ** -0.154
(0.238) (0.157)
Log of US Long-Term Debt FPI 0.092
(0.111)
Ratio of Financial Deposits to GDP 0.012 -0.565
(0.302) (0.575)
Exports as a % of GDP 0.013 -0.032
(0.023) (0.024)
Imports as a % of GDP -0.007 0.028
(0.024) (0.027)
Control for Changes in Dividend Tax Rates? N Y Y
Country and Year Effects? Y Y Y
Country-Specific Time Trends? N Y Y
Observations 256 203 203
Countries 44 42 42
R-squared 0.94 0.99 0.97
Note: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the log of US equity FPI. The dependent variable in column 3 is the log of US long-
term debt FPI. The corporate tax rate is the top statutory corporate rate in each year. The log of US FDI is the log of the direct investment 
position of US firms. Log of GDP per capita (in US$, in PPP terms) is from the World Bank’s WDI database. Log of population is from 
the World Bank’s WDI database. Aggregate market capitalization is drawn from the World Bank’s WDI database. Log of US debt FPI is 
from TIC. The ratio of financial deposits to GDP is from an updatedversion of Beck et al. (2000). Exports and imports as a % of GDP are 
from the World Bank’s WDI database.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%.  
Table 4: Tax Rate Changes and FPI, 1994-2005
(1) (2) (3)
Log of US Equity 
FPI
Log of US Equity 
FPI
Log of US Long-
term Debt FPI